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State, Dep’t of Bus and Indus. v. Titlemax of Nev., Inc., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 55 (Sep. 23, 2021)1
TITLE LOANS: EXTENSIONS AND FAIR MARKET VALUE INCLUSIONS

Summary
Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) § 604A.5074(1) regulates title loans and limits the duration
of the original term to 30 days. NRS § 604A.5074(3) extends the permissible duration up to 210
days if the title loan meets the requirements outlined in the subsection. A specific requirement
delineated in the subsection is that 210-day title loans cannot be subject to any extension. NRS §
604A.065 defines extensions. Here, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the extension prohibition
on the 210-day title loans includes refinances based on the plain language of NRS § 604A.065.
Furthermore, NRS § 604A.5076(1) limits a title loan amount to the “fair market value”
(FMV) of a secured vehicle. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the FMV limitation only refers
to the principal amount of the loan and does not include interest and other costs and fees.

Background
In 2018, the Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division
(FID) examined TitleMax’s practices. FID argued that TitleMax’s “refinances” were actually
“extensions” which violated NRS § 604A.5074(3)(c). FID also argued that TitleMax failed to
properly account for the fair market value when securing vehicles, as the amount of the loans did
not include interest and fees in the calculation. Based on their findings, FID issued TitleMax a
“Needs Improvement” rating.
TitleMax sued in the Nevada district court and sought declaratory, temporary, and
permanent injunctive relief to enjoin FID from imposing disciplinary action based on the findings.
TitleMax argued that refinancing a title loan does not amount to a prohibited extension and that
the FMV limitation refers only to the principal amount of the loan. The district court granted
TitleMax’s motion for summary judgment. FID appealed.

Discussion
Refinances are a species of extension that are prohibited under NRS § 604A.065
The Court held that TitleMax’s practice of refinancing violates NRS § 604A.5074 and NRS
§ 604A.065. In interpreting NRS § 604A.065, the Court analyzed the statutory words using their
plain and ordinary meaning. 2 Using this interpretation, the Court rejected TitleMax’s argument
that a refinance is not an extension simply because the original loan is paid off when a second loan
is made. The Court held that TitleMax’s practice of refinancing functions substantively as an
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See Lofthouse v. State, 136 Nev. 378, 380, 467 P.3d 609, 611 (2020) (noting that the court gives statutory words
their plain meaning unless the context requires a technical meaning, or a different meaning is apparent from the
context).
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extension because the same lender and borrower are involved, the principal is only given to the
borrower once, and the principal must be repaid when the loan’s term expires. The Court also held
that, based on the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms used, the parties’ dispute over the proper
characterization of TitleMax’s refinancing product was without merit.
Furthermore, NRS § 604A.065 defines an extension as “any extension or rollover of a loan
beyond the date on which the loan is required to be paid in full under the original terms of the loan
agreement, regardless of the name given to the extension or rollover.”3 TitleMax argues that, by
treating a refinance as a type of extension, certain language found in NRS § Chapter 604A would
become superfluous. TitleMax references NRS § 604A.5037(3)4 to argue that the word
“refinancing” would have no meaning and that the use of the word shows that the Legislature did
not intend to include a refinance as a type of extension under NRS § 604A.5074(3). However, the
Court held that the fact that NRS § 604A.5037(3) allows additional time when refinancing
confirms that the Legislature views a refinance as a form of extension.

The FMV limitation refers to the principal amount of the loan
The Court held that NRS Chapter 604A’s definition of “loan” was unhelpful in determining
whether the FMV limitation refers only to the principal amount of the loan. 5 In interpreting NRS
Chapter 604A’s definition of “loan,” the Court analyzed the term under its ordinary meaning. The
Court also looked to other states and their definition of “loan” to hold that the term means “a sum
of money at interest,” not the sum of money lent and the interest.6
The Court distinguished their holding from that of Check City.7 In Check City, the Court
held that interest and other fees must be included in the loan calculation for deferred deposit loans.
The Court acknowledged that it makes pragmatic and policy sense for the Legislature to regulate
deferred deposit loans differently than title loans. 8 The Court explained that deferred deposit loans
allow a borrower to discern the total cost of the loan at the time the lender accepts a post-dated
check. In the title loan context, however, interest accrues daily and is typically only determined
when the loan is finally paid off.
Furthermore, the Court highlighted policy reasons to support the distinction between title
loans and deferred deposit loans. The Court explained that a title loan lender does not have
incentive to inflate the total amount of a loan and interest because the lender’s recover is ultimately
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limited to the value of the vehicle that secures its loan.9 In fact, the Court argued that laws which
cap the amount of a title loan based on the value of a vehicle should incentivize lenders to loan the
maximum value of the vehicle. 10As a result, the Court held that, under NRS § 604A5076(1), the
FMV limitation only refers to the principal amount of the loan, not including interest and fees.

Conclusion
The Court reversed the district court’s order granting declaratory relief to the extent that it
held that TitleMax’s refinancing practices does not violate NRS § 604A.5074 or NRS § 604A.065.
The Court held that the extension prohibition on TitleMax’s 210-day title loans includes refinances
as a type of extension based on the plain language of NRS § 604A.065.
Furthermore, the Court affirms in part the district court’s order granting summary judgment
and declaratory relief relating to TitleMax’s interpretation of the FMV limitation. The Court held
that, based on policy reasons and the ordinary meaning of the term “loan,” the FMV limitation
only refers to the principal amount of the loan.
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